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Abstract
Researching local leaders who must function under difficult circumstances, in disadvan-
tage peripheral areas, is both complex and challenging topic. Theoretically speaking, one 
may argue that such peripheral places, by nature, are forced into a negative dynamic 
(being far from a metropolitan area, having low-level public services, selective migra-
tion, and so on). Such a situation may limit these local leaders’ opportunities to realize 
their visions and goals, to apply their personal capabilities and biographies in the public 
sphere. The present article rejects the above logic, suggesting a more humanistic per-
spective. In support of the suggested approach, this article summarizes the findings of 
a series of empirical studies that describe a wide range of leadership modes exercised 
by Israeli local leaders functioning under demeaning peripheral conditions from 1983 
to 2017. The study shows that, despite their similar circumstances, these Israeli leaders 
were highly distinct in many ways. Different leadership typologies are discussed that 
were observed in the Israeli peripheries during those years: hierarchical vs. egalitarian, 
reactive vs. proactive, transactional vs. transformational, radical vs. pragmatic-reformer. 
On a broad theoretical level, the findings clearly indicate the need for explanations that 
go beyond the mere geographical-political context, delving into the humanistic sphere to 
study each leader’s unique personality and biography.
Keywords: community leadership, spatial periphery, mayors, urban leadership, 
disadvantaged towns, biographical resources, Israeli society, structuralism versus 
humanism, radicalism, transformational leadership, culture and leadership
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1. Introduction: local leadership and the nature of urban dynamics 
in disadvantaged peripheral areas
When speaking about the nature and qualities of place-based leadership, we can outline three 
main approaches.
The first is a structural approach or ‘the contextual thesis’ [1]. Scholars who follow this line of 
thought, as political economists or Marxists (with its various theoretical extensions1), tend to 
highlight and empower major objective forces in politics, sociology and geography, in a manner 
that reduces the potential of local leaders to shape their own environments. Accordingly, the 
structural conditions within which certain local leaders are embedded and engaged (e.g., power 
relations, class structure, their actual location within the national, spatial hierarchy), together 
mold and fix a context that substantially influences the volume of their deeds, and the quality 
and effectiveness of local leaders. In this view, disadvantaged places, such as peripheral towns 
or poor neighborhoods in marginal areas, that suffer under macro contextual forces, such as glo-
balization and neo-liberalization, negatively affect and worsen the welfare and living standards 
in their vicinities. Such conditions significantly restrict the abilities of local leaders, no matter 
who they are and what their cultural or biographical sources. In a structural analysis, such 
forces operate in a one-way direction: they redirect and shape the policy and decisions taken by 
local leaders, while the latter are unable to control theses forces. This structural mechanism may 
be even more rigid when it comes to municipal leadership. Beyond global or national forces, 
the fundamental nature of city politics is much more complicated and rife with conflictual and 
contradictory interests and values, as in: [5] real estate, community life, and municipal admin-
istration. Hence, leaders who represent disadvantaged communities are forced to face many 
exogenous problems and conflicts in a limited, by-the-book manner; they have almost no free-
dom to insert their visions, values, personalities, biographies and personal narratives. At best, 
they can solve problems reactively or sufficiently to cope by exchanging resources. As those 
who lack material, financial and political resources, and frequently face severe social problems, 
such local leaders are compelled to produce a distinct and narrow pattern of policy making, one 
that is oriented towards trouble shooting (i.e., finding immediate, short-term solutions), often 
producing poor strategies, rather than designing long-term, sustainable plans. Furthermore, 
seen from a Marxist viewpoint, local leaders, situated in places in desperate need of financial 
resources, will attempt to gain help by means of flexible, survivalist politics, shifting from one 
politician to another and turning to various ministries and philanthropic institutions. Their 
fundamental situation manipulates them to adopt and internalize a hierarchical and subjective 
politics—a position that obliges them to become integral parts of problem. Even those local 
leaders who are aware of this and make honest efforts to formulate policies designed to break 
the vicious cycle, will probably, eventually fall into a Sisyphean logic.
1See: [2]; for the Israeli context see [3, 4]. Tzfadia and Grinberg do point to active position taken by local leaders. However, 
in line with collective structuralism base of Marxist thinking, such reaction, shifts and other movements are not analyzed 
as they were an outcome of individual reaction but rather as a collective action that directed to challenge the capitalist 
super-structure.
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The second and contradictory theoretical perspective is one that may be called a humanistic 
approach or ‘the personality thesis’ [1]. Scholars who take this viewpoint tend to empower the 
abilities of local leaders, while putting aside or ignoring objective material conditions. Such 
studies analyze leadership qualities by emphasizing personalities, values, characteristics and 
perceptions, presuming these leaders to be “a problem-solver, crisis-handler and the man-
to-blame” [6]. As such, the extent to which a local leader appears on the political scene as an 
innovator, arbitrator, or mediator, this is not the outcome of particular objective circumstances 
nor of the municipal circumstances within which that local leader functions, but rather the 
outcome of that individual person’s ‘conception of office’ [6]. In other words, scholars who 
follow ‘the personality thesis’ ignore or minimize the role of structural forces as autonomous 
powers that shape urban order and determine the wellbeing of the local residents.
The current study follows a third approach, which I suggest labeling ‘the humanistic-inter-
pretational approach’ for analyzing local leadership. Scholars, who follow this approach [1, 
5, 7–13] accept the notion that certain structural situations of disadvantaged places may have 
a negative impact and restrict the abilities of local leaders to accomplish their desired goals. 
Furthermore, unlike ‘the personality thesis’ (which is often correlated with conservative 
views), these scholars view real politics, material and macro structural conditions as being 
frequently manipulated by politicians and certain economic interests. However, unlike ‘the 
structural-contextual thesis’, they incorporate the leader as the one who interprets context and 
has the potential to become a powerful actor within the system. In other words, these scholars 
consider the local leader as an independent variable, shaped by structural forces and autono-
mously reshaping them at the same time.
Based on this humanistic-interpretational framework, the current study seeks to empirically 
examine and analyze the case of certain Israeli mayors and local leaders, who represent and 
lead relatively disadvantaged urban areas, by examining how they interpret and manage 
their difficult situations. This analysis addresses the following specific questions: To what 
extent have these local leaders succeeded in improving the wellbeing and quality-of-life of 
their resident citizens? What practical added value or improvement did their actions and 
policies provide? Were certain aspects of their personalities (e.g., perceptions, values, cha-
risma, visions, political narratives or biographies) recognized and disseminated in the public 
sphere?
To address these questions, the present study summarizes a series of empirical studies that 
explored different types of Israeli mayors and local leaders in some peripheral Israeli munici-
palities during the period from 1983 to 2017. It also discusses the relationship and the dialog 
conducted between the examined local leaders and their constituents, as well as their entire 
socio-political environment.
2. The context: Israeli geographical peripheries
The local leaders under discussion in this article were, and some still are, leading Israeli 
medium-sized towns located in the peripheries of the State of Israel, categorized as having a 
Understanding Leadership in Disadvantaged Peripheral Areas: The Case of Mayors and Local…
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.76047
63
low socio-economic status.2 In broad terms, historically, these towns were labeled ‘develop-
ment towns’ (Heb., arei pitu’ah). Shortly after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, 
the Israeli government and national planning authorities prepared to accommodate the large 
influx of Jewish immigrants, many from Arab states. To this end, during the 1950s and early 
1960s, the Israeli authorities founded and built about 35 ‘new towns’ in the frontier areas of 
the new state. These included the following towns (some of which later became large cities): 
Ashdod, Be’er-Sheva (Beersheba), Beit-She’an, Kiryat-Shemona, Lod (Lyda), Migdal ha-Emek, 
Netivot, Ofakim, Ramle, Yavne, and Yeruham.3 In most cases, these new towns were located 
at a distance from the big metropolitan areas of Israel (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv). As such, they 
were disadvantaged and suffered from the significantly poor conditions that were typical of 
peripheral areas, such as: an employment base that rested on traditional and low-tech indus-
tries (e.g., food, textiles and mining industries); a high rate of unemployment; low income 
levels; high levels of socioeconomic instability; low quality public services; and a narrow tax 
base. In addition, for many years, these towns also suffered from a selective and negative pat-
tern of emigration (the better-educated young people would leave to find work in larger and 
more affluent urban areas), a phenomenon commonly known as ‘brain drain’, that further 
reduced the socio-economic potential of those towns.
As for the sociological and ethnic aspects, the vast majority of the people who now live in 
those towns are the second and third generations of new immigrant parents from Muslim 
countries; many accustomed to traditional-hierarchical interactions with the broader polit-
ical environment [14]. Since the early 1990s, in the greater national political arena, Israeli 
society has undergone a sharp move towards a neo-liberalized and globalized social order 
[15]—a dynamic that widened the socioeconomic and spatial gaps between rich and poor 
areas in Israel. In addition, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, Israeli munici-
palities have come under more scrutiny and have been subjected to tighter regulation by the 
Israeli Treasury and the Ministry of the Interior, particularly the poorest and lowest ranking 
municipalities.4
Based on humanistic-interpretational approach mentioned above, the goal of the following 
analysis is to address the question: How do leaders in those disadvantaged towns cope with 
and transcend their demeaning conditions? The following analysis and discussion address 
this question by identifying, conceptualizing, and classifying various types of local leaders 
using common leadership models.
The empirical analysis consists of three sections. The first section focuses on the personal-
ity and strategies of the Mayor of Yavne-Meir Sheetrit (1974–1992), describing his mayoral 
2According Israeli official statistic, each among all Israeli cities, towns and settlements categorized in one of 10 statistical 
clusters; each cluster represent a certain level of socioeconomic conditions. Settlements who appears in cluster 1 repre-
sent the lowest level of municipalities cluster 10 represent the highest level of urban standards. In the research period, 
the settlements that under consideration appeared in clusters 3–4.
3Up until 1948 Lod and Ramle were homogenous Arab cities. During the Israeli War of Independence (May 1948), these 
cities were evacuated and a short while later rebuilt as new town. Along the years they become ethno-nationally mix 
town, see below Section 5.1.
4Further, in many case the Israeli ministry of interior affairs intervene in the local municipal affaires of these municipali-
ties, expropriating their powers and limiting local autonomy, as in some case reached to firing mayors replacing them 
with appointed high officials.
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activity, representing an entrepreneurial style of leadership. Second section analyses the 
relationship between the social and geographical conditions in Yeruham and the leadership 
qualities exercised by the mayors who served this town from 1983 to 2005. This includes a 
more detailed discussion of an egalitarian leadership style, as expressed by the personality 
and strategies of Mayor Moti Avisror, comparing it to other types of leadership, mainly hier-
archical and meritocratic. The third section analyzes some common local leadership styles 
among politically-active Israeli-Arab civilians engaged in contemporary Israeli ‘mixed cities 
and towns’ (consisting of resident citizens/communities with different ethnic and national 
identities). This section specifically focuses on Faraj Eben-Faraj, a municipal council mem-
ber (2012–present), who represents a new model of leadership, one which I call the ‘prag-
matic reformer’. Here, special attention is paid to the political narrative and to biographical 
resources, as crucial elements that support the attitudes and abilities of this leader, as well as 
any other leader.
3. The local entrepreneurial leader
Any city or town has a set of objective attributes—geographical, sociological or political that 
provide its relative advantage or, to use Michael Porter’s term, its ‘competitive advantage’. 
In general, this concept refers to the notion that the “endowments of inputs, such as labor, 
natural resources and financial capital […] enable the nation [or city] to productively use and 
upgrade its input” [16]. In an urban context, such input may be either ‘fixed’ (e.g., climate, 
or landscape, or the distance to a big metropolitan area) or ‘dynamic’, such as changes in 
state tax-benefit policies, or in commuter habits, or in housing and residential preferences. 
A crucial point regarding local leadership is that ‘competitive advantage’ cannot be always 
regarded as an explicit objective entity, but rather as something that should be identified or 
even invented (i.e., something bound to subjectivity). Successful leaders are those who are 
better at identify or inventing such advantages and utilizing them wisely on behalf of the city 
residents. The following discussion demonstrates this guiding principle by reference to Meir 
Sheetrit, the Mayor of Yavne (1974–1992) ([14], pp. 106–107; [17]).
3.1. Political, geographic and economic contexts
Meir Sheetrit was a young vibrant activist when first elected to be the Mayor of Yavne in 
1974—a small Israeli town located at the southern border of the Tel Aviv metropolitan area. 
Yavne was established by Jewish immigrants from Morocco in the mid-1950s. During the 
1960s and 1970s, Yavne ranked as one of the poorest municipalities in Israel, suffering from 
inadequate or lacking infrastructures and services, stigmatized and characterized by a high 
rate of social-welfare problems.
3.2. The mayor as an innovator of ‘competitive advantage’
A short while after being elected, Sheetrit formulated a vision for Yavne as an attractive place 
that can provide ‘equal opportunity housing’ for local and non-local Israelis ready to live in 
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Yavne. He emphasized that, although Yavne was not within the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, 
it was, in fact, adjacent to it. Thus, Sheetrit claimed that Yavne has the potential to become an 
attractive suburb for middle- and upper-middle class populations. However, in order to attain 
that goal, Yavne would first have to gain a competitive advantage—something that would 
convince members of the middle class this Yavne is worthy.In the late 1970s, Sheetrit realized 
that many Israelis had changed their life styles and preferences in regard to housing, seeking 
for more privacy, wanting to live in private home with large yards. Acting on his intuition, 
Sheetrit prepared a strategic plan and took steps to make Yavne an attractive place particu-
larly for middle-class emigrants from nearby (people who could not afford to live in Tel Aviv 
proper due to the very high cost of housing there). By doing so, he thought, Yavne would gain 
an advantage, one that would later spread and eventually benefit the older lower-class resi-
dents of Yavne. Unlike Yavne’s former mayors, who had been passive and acted reactively, 
Sheetrit was proactive and determined to implement his municipal vision and strategy. In 
doing so, he initially rejected the existing official city plan (originally designed for build-
ing a new neighborhood of high-rise residential buildings), profoundly changing the urban 
master plan and essentially replacing it with a new design. Sheetrit’s alternative master plan 
focused on the construction of a large new neighborhood, one suited to the current middle-
class, ground-floor housing orientation and living standard.
Then, he made an advertising campaign promoting this new Yavne neighborhood target-
ing middle-class Israelis in the vicinity. Furthermore, knowing that there was a large Israel 
Defense Force military base not far from Yavne, inhabited by I.D.F. officers fitting the socio-
logical profile of the Israeli middle class, Mayor Sheetrit initiated promotional meetings with 
those career officers, convincing them to buy homes in this neighborhood and to emigrate to 
Yavne; he succeeded in this mission. By the mid-1980s, a new upper-middle-class neighbor-
hood had been built, bought and was inhabited in the western section of Yavne, consisting of 
about 1000 spacious, private homes, each with a large courtyard.
3.3. Overcoming challenging class conflicts
The next stage towards realizing Sheetrit’s vision was the most crucial and difficult one. 
Sheetrit sought to utilize the socioeconomic advantages embodied by this group of I.D.F. per-
sonnel to benefit the entire population of Yavne. To that end, his general policy was to initiate 
or enable projects designed to integrate these new residents with the relatively-disadvantaged 
veteran residents of Yavne. This posed a complicated challenge, putting Sheetrit at a politi-
cal crossroads. Seen from the perspective of socioeconomic classes, the natural tendency of 
members of the upper-middle class is to protect the use and exchange values of their proper-
ties, often by practicing self-segregation (such as by building sophisticated boundaries, both 
concrete and abstract, designed to discourage social integration). At first, this was the case 
in Yavne. For example, in the mid-1980s, young parents in the new neighborhood, estab-
lished a new elementary public school, built especially to serve their own children and, thus, 
to avoid integration. As mayor, Sheetrit objected to their initiative, determined to create an 
integrative educational and sociological system, first and foremost, as a means to allow the 
disadvantaged children a chance to increase their social mobility. Officially, Sheetrit could 
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reject this initiative since the Israeli law allow mayors to enforce integration in the school 
system5. However, he did not utilized this option. Instead, to overcome the middle-class resis-
tance and to avoid bitterness, Sheetrit adopted a pragmatic approach, suggesting the new 
residents a deal. Unlike conventional thinking, in which politicians presume the logic of a 
‘zero sum game’ when negotiating with outgroups, Sheetrit negotiated using a ‘win-win’ 
strategy. Working together with professional educators and experts, he adopted an educa-
tional model in which the curriculum and teaching process in the new school was not fixed, 
but rather highly flexible. The new school incorporated the ‘individual teaching method’—a 
novel and, as yet, unfamiliar model in those days. In practical terms, this meant that the chil-
dren of the relatively affluent families would not have to suffer at lower educational levels but 
would rather be encouraged to advance at their own speed, in accordance with their personal 
abilities. Meanwhile, the relatively disadvantaged children would not be harmed, still getting 
the necessary time and attention from their teachers. This enabled Sheetrit’s goal to be met, 
as children from different social classes socialized in integrated classrooms with their class-
mates. By applying this model, Sheetrit and the educational staff succeeded in advancing the 
interests of both communities, while avoiding the conflict of interest.
Mayor Sheetrit’s second attempt to block an unacceptable initiative, instigated for the pur-
pose of avoiding integration, occurred later on, when some of the new residents wanted to 
open a sports club (‘the water park’) near their neighborhood; they established it as a non-
profit association in which the owners (i.e., shareholders) of the potentially exclusive club 
were all residents of the affluent neighborhood. Mayor Sheetrit was once again concerned 
that this might encourage a pattern of segregation between new and old residents. However, 
being a pragmatic and creative leader, he did not reject this initiative outright, but insisted 
on establishing some prerequisite ownership criteria that would open the water park to other 
members. Sheetrit wanted to promote the circulation of social capital and to reshape the local 
social system, making it more inclusive and integrative. As such, his main precondition was 
that at least one third of the club’s shareholders come from outside the affluent neighborhood. 
This obliged the founders to appeal to residents of the old neighborhoods and to convince 
them to accept partial ownership of the club.
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, Yavne had become much stronger, much less 
stigmatized, and much more integrated. The high school now includes children from all 
the social classes and socioeconomic levels. The local partisan-politics system is not strictly 
divided according to ethnic or class lines. The aforementioned sports club became an inclu-
sive, rather exclusive, place and is not identified the upper-middle class. Since the 1990s (and 
more intensely since 2010), Yavne has raised its status and is currently considered a strong 
suburban magnet that attracts young couples from broader areas surrounding the Tel Aviv 
metropolis. Indeed, such improvements were also caused by other sources and mechanisms 
(steps taken by the three mayors who followed Sheetrit). Nonetheless, taking a broad per-
spective, the strategic steps made by Mayor Sheetrit during the 1980s caused a positive, fun-
damental shift, substantially altering the urban socio-cultural dynamics in Yavne. Not only 
5According to the Israeli “Mandatory Education Law of 1949,” while the municipalities were the official zoning authori-
ties, school children were only to be registered in the schools within their own residential zones.
Understanding Leadership in Disadvantaged Peripheral Areas: The Case of Mayors and Local…
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.76047
67
did Sheetrit correctly identify the competitive advantage of Yavne, he also tailored it to fit the 
target populations. Furthermore, after gaining this advantage, Sheetrit harnessed the abilities 
and high potential of his upper-middle class residents for the benefit of the greater Yavne 
community. Sheetrit accomplished these difficult and selfless tasks by remaining commit-
ted to his urban social vision, standing firm and engaging in tough negotiations with rela-
tively strong people. To borrow a well-known typological model suggested by Svara [8], it 
seems that Sheetrit fits the entrepreneurial model of leadership (or the ‘innovator’). According 
Svara, the entrepreneurial leader is one who sets a policy that strives to push forward structural 
reforms within the urban sphere and successfully carries them.6
The above analysis concentrated on the relationship between a mayor and his socio-political 
environment, showing that strong leadership can make a significant difference. However, this 
analysis may be deceptive and unintentionally lead some to a naïve attitude towards leader-
ship, due to the use of the social-class perspective to analyze the ‘leader-followers relation-
ship’, while taking for granted the cultural and value orientations of both the leader and the 
followers. To achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the mechanism of leadership, 
we must also incorporate the cultural context and the value orientation of the actors involved. 
The following section highlights and clarifies this aspect.
4. Hierarchical, meritocratic and egalitarian-transformational local 
leaders
The volume and quality of the resources given to politicians, whether material or abstract, 
existing or invented, may indicate very little about the real dynamics of leadership and urban 
change. Resources alone offer meager insight, if one ignores the question: What are the fun-
damental cultural values in a politician’s background that guide the practical use of those 
resources? The following discusses this question and provides empirical comparisons of vari-
ous types of local leaders in Yeruham.
4.1. The geographic, political, sociological and cultural context
Yeruham, inhabited by approximately 10,000 people [11], is a small disadvantaged town 
located in Israel’s Negev desert, far from the biggest Israeli metropolitan areas. The political 
history of this town in the later twentieth century and early twenty-first century shows three 
substantial transformations, each with a distinct pattern: hierarchy, meritocracy and egalitari-
anism. Since its founding in 1955 and until the early 1983, Yeruham was markedly dominated 
by the Israeli establishment. The town was characterized by a high level of dependency and 
a client-patron-style relationship, further exacerbated in the 1980s, when it was governed by 
a mayor who employed a paternalistic and centralistic style (from 1983 to 1992). This mayor 
6Svara ([8], Figures 2–4, p. 105). In Svara’s words: the innovator is one who characterize by having a high level of “effec-
tiveness in policy initiation” plus a high level of “effectiveness in implementation”.
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regularly bypassed the professional suggestions made by other officials and uprooted local 
criticism by means of a tactic of co-opting political rivals. At that time, such leadership norms 
had a great impact on Yeruham’s residents. For example, the citizens were deeply convinced 
that if they have a tangible problem, the best way to handle it would be by seeking political 
assistance by means of gaining personal favor with the mayor, rather than making an effort 
to deal with their own problems by themselves. This political pattern changed significantly in 
1992, when a young local leader, Mayor Moti Avisror, entered the Mayor’s Office (1992–2003).
Right after being elected, Avisror stated that he wished to substantially change the common 
practice in the Yeruham municipality and in city politics as a whole. Avisror took many steps 
designed to undermine the culture of dependency and to thwart the popular habit of lean-
ing on exogenous political aid. He strove to make Yeruham a place where its citizens are 
prouder, more independent and self-sustaining. For instance, when local citizens would enter 
the Mayor’s Office seeking help, Avisror would politely reject them, saying: “You should first 
go to the professional department manager, who’ll gladly help you. If they can’t help you 
there, then come back to me.” Furthermore, in contrast to the former prevailing governing 
norms (based on access to the mayor being granted only to select political comrades or by 
nepotism), Mayor Avisror practiced norms based on professional considerations and meri-
tocratic values. Thus, whenever the municipality of Yeruham sought to recruit professional 
contractors, Avisror insisted that the screening of potential candidates be given to impartial, 
private agencies that would examine them in accordance with professional criteria. He always 
explained to those seeking jobs within the municipality: “First, you should pass the external 
tests,” (i.e., the relevant occupational aptitude tests). By applying such practices and policy, 
Avisror sought to change the ‘old’ well-established norms and to promote a political culture 
of professionalism and autonomy. Unsurprisingly, in late 1990s, the municipality of Yeruham 
received many awards from various Israeli ministries and state agencies praising Mayor 
Avisror and his staff on their excellence and professionalism in management and leadership.
However, many young people in Yeruham were deeply disappointed with this managerial 
style, and unlike the governmental ministries and officials, they did not consider it to be effi-
cient or successful; they argued that the unavoidable outcome of choosing meritocratic values 
and higher professional standards is the deprivation and exclusion the weakest, most disad-
vantaged residents. To a certain degree, their criticism was justified. This highlights the para-
doxical nature of applying the meritocratic model of leadership in marginal, disadvantaged 
peripheral areas; the inherent structure of this model promotes and benefits only the more 
professional and well-educated members of the lower class (often correlating with young 
people). In many cases, the less privileged, those most in need of help from local leadership, 
do not stand a chance in meritocratic competition.
A reasonable and logical solution to this problem might be to implement an egalitarian policy 
alongside the meritocracy, as, in fact, was done by Mayor Avisror. Although he insisted on 
establishing local norms based on higher professional standards, at same time, he advanced 
certain egalitarian projects, directly targeting the young strata of local residents, such as the 
high-school students, as described below.
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4.2. The egalitarian-transformational leader
From the moment he took office, Mayor Avisror strove to shape the social order in a way 
that would provide local teenagers with an equal opportunity. He determined that the local 
formal education system was the best platform for the fulfillment of this vision and for the 
promotion of social mobility for the younger generation.
To that end, Mayor Avisror would have to overcome certain difficult structural problems to 
enable the application of such equal-opportunity policy and programming under the inherent 
conditions of peripherality and marginality. Although his policy appears to be worthy and 
achievable, a structural-cultural perspective may dampen that optimism. As implied earlier, 
local leaders who attempt to break free of the natural mechanism that maintains and perpetu-
ates poverty, must inevitably deal with severe problems born of local cultural preconceptions, 
such as: clientelism [18], passiveness, fatalism [19], cultural distrust [20], and low-level expec-
tations. Nonetheless, the following empirical analysis shows that this structural scenario was 
not necessarily practiced. Determined local leaders, who are well-apprised of local political 
culture, may successfully break the vicious cycle to introduce a totally different socio-cultural 
dynamic.
Until mid-1990s, Yeruham high-school students (there was only one high-school) presented 
poor achievements in terms of the rate of students who were awarded full high-school matric-
ulation certificates. For three decades, the residents of Yeruham, especially the children and 
youth, passed through the low-quality educational system, characterized by low standards, 
low expectations, low professionality, and graduated, suffering from a sense of stigma and 
with a poor self-image. This negative dynamic significantly changed during the late 1990s 
under Avisror’s leadership.
In 1994, the Israeli Ministry of Education decided to take affirmative action by applying a pol-
icy that granted poor municipalities (including Yeruham) some 40 million new shekels (about 
10 million dollars) to improve their school systems. Avisror recognized this opportunity to 
apply his egalitarian vision by instituting a massive reform in the Yeruham school system. 
He stated that the ultimate goal of the Yeruham municipality is to raise the rate of students 
who graduate with full high-school matriculation certificates. To accomplish this, he hired an 
expert team of educators to execute an intensive intervention in the high-school, and to work 
together with the students, the parents, the teaching staff, and the Municipal Department of 
Education. By 1996, after the great efforts that had been invested, Yeruham began to enjoy the 
results, as the rate of high-school graduates with full high school matriculation certificates rose 
dramatically from a mere 20% to 60%, remaining stable since then. As will be shown in the 
analysis below, Avisror’s success in accomplishing significant structural changes in organiza-
tional culture would not have come to pass without his personal leadership resources and his 
effective mode of interaction and persuasion with his constituency and the higher authorities.
This educational intervention project began in the summer of 1994, when Mayor Avisror held 
a general meeting (in the desert just outside the town), including the participation of: high-
school students, parents, teachers, educators and representatives of the municipality. The 
official explanation given for this meeting was: “preparation for the upcoming school year.” 
Mayor Avisror recalled the proceedings as follows:
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I remember myself sitting cross-legged [i.e., oriental style; body-language interpreted by Israelis as a 
genuine expression of spontaneity and authenticity]. I asked someone to speak briefly about his role and 
life story. When it was my turn, I said: “My name is Moti Avisror. I was born here in Yeruham. I had a 
poor childhood. About twenty years ago, when I was seventeen years old and still studying in our local 
high-school, I was enrolled in the study track designed prepare me and my classmate for a full high-
school matriculation certificate. But then some officials from the Ministry of Education canceled that 
study track. This was traumatic news for me and my classmate; I was shocked and almost desperate. 
However, despite the difficulty, I decided to continue studying for the matriculation examinations on 
my own. I took myself in hand and made great efforts to achieve a full matriculation certificate. I wanted 
to improve myself and to prove to myself that I could do it--and I did!
So, you see--if I did it, there’s no reason why all of you cannot! So, what I am asking now is that all 
you students sitting here with us, join the prep course and get yourself a full high-school matriculation 
certificate. Just do what I did--dare! Strive! Make an effort!”
This statement was not enthusiastically accepted by everyone present at that meeting. Some 
students, parents, teachers, educators, and even the school principal refused, at first, to take 
part in the mayor’s vision, arguing that Avisror did not really know enough about the high-
school. Initially, they did not understand what he was expecting of them. Some declared: “It’s 
an impossible goal.” Others believed: “It’s a waste of time and energy.”
This kind of reaction was not entirely unexpected; frequently marginal or disadvantaged 
communities are characterized by a low level of expectations and a political culture of distrust 
towards authorities and elites, often resulting from histories of bad collective experiences, 
similar to the socio-political history of Yeruham before Avisror became the mayor. The people 
of Yeruham had a long and bad experience with politicians (both nationally and locally), as 
well as with elite groups, all of whom had low expectations of them and never considered 
encouraging them to try harder, never thinking they might succeed.
Avisror sought to put an end to that negative dynamic. He refused to accept the rational-
izations voiced by teachers, parents and students. He insisted on executing his novel inter-
vention program. Shortly after that first general meeting, he held a conversation with the 
reluctant high-school principal and fired him, replacing him with a cooperative principal. 
The entire concept of classroom learning was substantially changed once the recruited pro-
fessional contractors from outside Yeruham arrived. Meanwhile, Mayor Avisror interacted 
with various parties—bureaucrats, teachers, parents, students and contractors—revealing his 
fundamentally different mode of leadership to them (to break the old stereotype); he strove 
to change their fatalistic orientations and to raise their levels of expectation and optimism. 
Recall that in 1996, the official data received from the Israeli Ministry of Education was very 
positive, citing a dramatic rise in the number of students who completed the maximal high-
school study track. Avisror also utilized this good news to generate positive, attitude-chang-
ing publicity via the local news media, posters in school corridors, announcements at official 
meetings, stressing one simple, blatant message: “Yes, you can!”. Furthermore, whenever the 
mayor met the officials, teachers, parents and students who had attended that first meeting, 
he reminded them, pleasantly but firmly, of their original, skeptical reactions to his initiative, 
and he did this repeatedly on every possible occasion. Following Richard L. Daft’s conceptual 
framework [21], Avisror utilized a storytelling technique in which the leader tells the follow-
ers a story, involving facts and myths, one that teaches an important lesson; that story is then 
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often repeated by the followers. According to Daft, the more the leader repeats that story, the 
more likely it is that the followers will internalize and assimilate the desired message and the 
embedded values.
In summation, the above analysis shows that policy outcomes cannot be understood solely 
by analyzing the volume of the resources given to a community or a mayor (in this case, gov-
ernmental financial assistance given to the municipality of Yeruham in the mid-1990s). Policy 
makers, as well as researchers, must also answer the question: How do leaders utilize gifted 
resources?
In light of these consequences, it appears that Avisror’s policies fit the type of leader called a 
‘transformational leader’ by Bass and Riggio [22]. Unlike a ‘transactional leader’, Avisror did 
not identify success with the satisfaction of his constituent, nor by exchanging gratification 
with them. Instead, he worked to reshape their expectations and consciousness; by doing so, 
he got them to internalize a valuable life lesson, beyond the specific, concrete outcomes (i.e., 
increased full-matriculation rates). That lesson was: “What may seem to be impossible at first 
may be possible. That depends on you!” Avisror formulized this particular message inten-
tionally, in order to dash the negative presumptions (or idees fixes). According to Bass and 
Riggio, the main features that characterize “transformational leadership” are the reshaping 
of expectations, the setting of high expectations, the internalization of greater responsibility, 
and facing real challenges.
Thus far, this discussion has emphasized the notion that leaders (both Sheetrit and Avisror) 
have succeeded in their missions by utilizing personal internal resources: to motivate change, 
to determine which challenges to face and how to handle them, to conceptualize and ana-
lyze the state-of-mind of others, and to negotiate with conviction regardless of the others’ 
reticence or skepticism. An additional subcategory within ‘personal internal resources’ is—
‘biographical resources’. The following section demonstrates the political use of biographical 
resources empirically by presenting it in a different context–that of local Israeli-Arab leaders 
in mixed cities and towns.
5. The pragmatic-reformer as a local leader
5.1. The political context
Israeli-Arab citizens compose about 20% of the Israeli population. Some live in homogenous 
Arab settlements; others live in mixed cities, such as: Yafo (Jaffa, a borough of Tel Aviv), 
Jerusalem, Haifa, and some small-medium towns like: Lod (Lyda), Ramle, Akko (Acre) and 
Nazareth-I’llit. The vast majority of citizens who live in those locations are Jews and none 
are governed by an Arab mayor. In other words, the Arabs citizens living in such places are 
minority populations at both the local-municipal and the national levels. Generally, the stan-
dard-of-living of those Israeli-Arab citizens residing in mixed cities and towns is lower than 
that of the Jewish citizens living in entirely Jewish cities (such as Yavne and Yeruham). Several 
factors dictate this relative inferiority ([13], pp. 261–268]): the political histories of the mixed 
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cities and towns, the cultural and political heritage of their residents and, no less important, 
the political orientation (attitudes, values, perceptions) of the Israeli-Arab activists who are 
engaged in mixed-city/town politics. The following provides a more detailed discussion.
Until recently, Israeli-Arab citizens living in mixed cities and towns were dominated by two 
prototypical kinds of leaders ([13], pp. 261–268). The first kind is the traditional-hierarchical 
leader, who holds a pragmatic, relatively-subjective position towards the Israeli majority and 
the Israeli establishment. The basic rationale of this type of leader is that there is no point in 
even thinking about changing the existing power structure (i.e., the Jewish majority versus 
the Arab minority). Based on this perception, such leaders believe that by maintaining close 
ties with the existing power centers (e.g., municipal officials, mayors, Israeli politicians) and 
by respecting the rules of the game, they better serve the material and political interests of 
the Arabs residents and may benefit them more. In addition, unlike radical activists (more 
below), such Israeli-Arab leaders are deeply convinced that their local problems have nothing 
to do with national problems (i.e., the ongoing conflict between Jews and Arabs) that should 
remain separate. Hence, they feel that local problems can be resolved incrementally, by means 
of local arrangements made at the local level of governance.
In a sharp contrast, radical Israeli-Arab local leaders view the power system fundamentally 
differently; they firmly believe that national and local-municipal issues are intertwined. As 
such, they blame the Israeli establishment as being primarily responsible for their bad circum-
stances and the low standard-of-living in the mixed cities and towns. Due to this fundamental 
preconception, the radicals despise their more senior hierarchical opponents, blaming them 
for cooperating with the hegemonic power and being manipulated by it. Thus, the chosen 
strategy of radical Israeli-Arab local leaders is to ignore governmental and municipal activ-
ity. Instead, they favor taking part in various NGOs (through which they wish to promote 
psychosocial change in the minds of the Israeli-Arab public) and by appealing to the Israeli 
Supreme Court.
It seems that since the beginning of the twenty-first century, these two competing types of 
leaders are both being challenged by a third type of young Israeli-Arab local leader—one who 
severely criticizes both the traditional-hierarchical type and the radical type. Someone who 
clearly represents this new third type of Israeli-Arab leader is Faraj Eben-Faraj—a local activist 
in the city of Lod (Lyda). Before presenting a political profile of this person I’ll briefly review 
the geographical context, i.e., the local condition upon which this leader interact and operate.
Lod (Lyda) is a small-medium mixed town located not far from Tel Aviv. In 2017, its total 
population was about 74,000 residents [23] and it ranked as one of the poorest municipalities 
in Israel. Two-thirds of the city population are Jews and the rest are Arabs. Most of residents 
(especially the Arabs) came from low socioeconomic strata and have, for many years, expe-
rienced poor levels of municipal services. In addition, this town is characterized by severe 
social problems, such as: serious ethnic conflicts; [24] a high crime rate; and a bad reputation 
as a commercial center for illegal drugs. Furthermore, since the early 1980s, many of Lod’s 
residents have been concerned about housing; there is a severe lack of suitable housing, espe-
cially for the Arab population (most of whom live in illegal housing). Faraj Eben-Faraj was 
born into this context and is affected by it.
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5.2. The pragmatic-reformer model
Faraj Eben-Faraj began his political activity during 2012 by calling the local Israeli-Arab resi-
dents to join him in an attempt to change the poor social conditions by suggesting a different 
model of leadership that I prefer to call pragmatic-reformism. The following discussion outlines 
the basic elements that define this model, while next subsection analyzes the biographical 
sources and resources that support it.
Eben-Faraj severely criticizes both the hierarchical and the radical activists with whom he 
used to socialize from time to time, mainly in his younger years (see below). As opposed to 
the radicals, Eben-Faraj adopted a pragmatic leadership style, one that does not sufficient 
with criticism and protest, but strives to advance practical solutions. Like the hierarchical 
leaders, he avoids the big national controversies relating to the ongoing Jewish-Arab conflict. 
Instead, he prefers to invest his energies in practical issues that seems achievable and afford-
able. He stated: “I don’t care about al-Aqsa. I don’t care about the issue of the occupied terri-
tories, nor about the conflict between the Jews and the Arabs” [28]. This is what differentiates 
Eben-Faraj from the radicals.
Eben-Faraj equally rejects the hierarchical model, arguing that such leaders do not effectively 
or comprehensively solve the real problems of the local Israeli-Arabs, because their actions 
are ad hoc (i.e., relating to specific, single cases) and ad-hominem (relating to a particular indi-
vidual). Thus, applying the hierarchical model means providing individual solutions to spe-
cific problems, which does not benefit the vast majority of the local Arabs in Lod. Instead, 
Eben-Faraj advocates making real changes by promoting and executing serious, comprehen-
sive reforms.
The fact is that Eben-Faraj did not reach these insights just by means of quiet reflection, nor 
were his personal political views shaped as a direct outcome of pure theoretical thinking; 
many of his ideas and opinions result from his personal experiences, especially during his 
childhood, and have become inextricable parts of his personality. Throughout his lifetime, he 
interacted and socialized with many people, with whom he had intense dialogs, eventually 
adopting, adapting and formalizing his own unique, personal political view. This holds an 
important lesson for the entire issue of understanding leadership. As shown below, the study 
of a leader’s biography is necessary not because it is interesting but rather to comprehend the 
basic personal, psychosocial experiences that yielded the individual’s potential for becoming 
a powerful mechanism able to shape real politics. The following subsection briefly clarifies 
this theoretical notion as a necessary step towards understanding the resources utilized by 
Eben-Faraj in contemporary local politics.
5.3. Biographical resources behind the pragmatic-reformer leader
Since the early 1980s, there has been a growing interest in studying the nature of the relation-
ship between individuals and greater society by researching their ‘biographical resources’ 
[13, 25–27]. Concisely put, this concept refers to the notion that certain abstract resources, 
such as motivation and moral justification for action, cannot be considered to be outcomes of 
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socialization or socio-political conditions (as is presumed by some strict ‘orthodox’ sociolo-
gists), but are also drawn from personal biography. Childhood experiences and significant 
events undergone by individuals during their lives may later become biographical resources. 
The crucial element lies in the nexus where objective experience meets subjectivity. The quali-
ties of the biographical resources depend on how each individual, or leader, recalls his/her 
own existence and sees his/her position vis-à-vis the world and its organization (or urban 
environment) [27]. Lynn Froggett and Prue Chamberlayne argue that, by focusing on this, 
researchers may identify abstract attributes, such as motivation, moral justification for action, 
and the discourse of social enterprise. Let us now apply the study of biographical resources 
for leadership to our case of the pragmatic-reformer—Faraj Eben-Faraj.
Faraj Eben-Faraj was born in Lod in 1970 to a local Muslim Israeli-Arab family. During the 1970s 
and 1980s, his father, Ebrahim Eben-Faraj, had served as a council member in the Lod municipal-
ity. In those days, Ebrahim held political views and a position that reflected the above hierarchical 
pattern. His son, Faraj, was exposed to this pattern, but rejected it. As an adult, Faraj Eben-Faraj 
pointed to an ongoing childhood experience that had led him to criticize this kind of politics:
In the early 1980s, when I was ten-year-old boy, I remember many activists, council members, who used 
to come to our house. During these meetings, my mother was almost always in the kitchen preparing 
refreshments on behalf of our guests. My job was to bring them to the table where my fathers’ colleagues 
used to sit and talk. I had no choice but to stand and wait nearby; after being in that position for years, 
I was forced to hear many conversations. I noticed that there was one general theme that ran through 
all those maybe hundreds of conversations. What these guests, actually politicians, wished to do was 
to solve local problems on a personal basis, on behalf of a specific man or woman. The repeated line was 
something like: “You should take care of this poor woman, because she has little kids, so we should ap-
peal to the Department of Education [in the municipality] to give her special treatment. We can fix her a 
job as a kindergarten assistant.” You see, I heard a great number of such conversations and I did not like 
it. I said to myself: “When I grow up, I’ll never ever follow this political tactic.” That’s why the Arabs in 
Lod stay in the lower [socioeconomic] strata. We must take a totally different approach and push reforms 
in order to improve the socioeconomic mobility of the younger generation. [28]
This quotation reflects a political narrative in which the leader rationalizes and explains 
his distinct political view. By doing so Eben-Faraj rationalized his fundamental objection 
to the hierarchical mode of leadership. Nonetheless, Eben-Faraj did not totally reject the 
values and worldview of his father and his father’s close social milieu. Later, during the 
late 1980s, he had also been exposed to the different socio-political milieu that of radical 
activists who were strongly opposed to his father. Faraj Eben-Faraj remembered an inter-
esting event that produced an additional pillar in the evolution of his personal political 
narrative and views:
When I was a boy, I saw and heard some Arab guys who belonged to the Communist Party. In general, 
they opposed my father, sometimes even despised him. I remember one day, two such guys were talk-
ing to each other, while my father and his buddy were sitting in the background. One said to his friend 
something like: “Ah…, leave them! After all, they don’t actually understand the real nature of politics. 
I don’t expect more from a taxi driver and his close friend, the bus driver (pointing to my father and his 
fellow).” You see, when I heard this talk, I was extremely angry. Why should a taxi driver know less 
than anyone else?! I know many common people who have a much better understanding of politics than 
some well-educated people! [28]
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This dialog caused Faraj Eben-Faraj to reformulate his political narrative in a way that rejected 
radicalism. Beyond natural rationalization, he also rejected radicalism for psychological rea-
sons; as one who emotionally identified with his father, he could not accept the critique and 
the hate voiced by those two radical activists. On the whole, Faraj Eben-Faraj adopted a model 
of pragmatic-reformism, simultaneously rejecting both hierarchical and radical views, though 
taking the best of each.
Based on his revises model, Faraj Eben-Faraj intervened in Lod’s local politics in a new and 
different way. After being elected to serve on the Lod Municipal Council in November 2012, 
he acted pragmatically by developing social relations with the Jewish mayor (Yair Revivo, 
2012–present) with whom he carried out serious reforms, including the construction and 
improvement of physical infrastructures, especially in the Arab neighborhoods, including: 
bridges, roads and a club for local Israeli-Arab teenagers.
Furthermore, a clear expression of Eben-Faraj’s political leadership style is seen in the way 
he handled the aforementioned explosive issue of all the illegal construction of Arab homes. 
From 2014 to 2016, the Israeli Ministry of Housing and Construction launched a program in 
an attempt to achieve a broader solution to local-Arab’s housing problem. Unlike the radicals, 
Eben-Faraj enthusiastically joined this program as a representative of Lod’s Arab population. 
Unlike the hierarchical leaders, who tended to address such matters on a house-by-house 
or person-by-person basis (often granting nepotistic preferential treatment), Faraj Eben-Faraj 
insisted on solving this problem comprehensively and for the long-term. To do so, he utilized 
his academic knowledge as a lawyer and the reputation he had gained in his ingroup by nego-
tiating with the Israeli establishment.
To summarize, the above analysis points to an interesting relationship between social envi-
ronment (at both macro and micro levels) and leadership. Eben-Faraj’s biographical expe-
riences became political narratives that, in turn, transformed into biographical resources, 
in this case, providing moral justification and motivation for his actions. These resources 
helped him achieve substantial practical and material benefits on behalf of the local Arabs 
in Lod.
6. Conclusions and discussion
The study and understanding local leaders functioning under demeaning conditions in disad-
vantaged peripheral locations may seem to be a pointless or fruitless endeavor, if one accepts 
that there is insufficient autonomy and that these leaders’ initiatives will inevitably be stymie. 
However, the empirical case studies presented above clearly contradict such structural logic. 
Examples were given of Jewish mayors and Israeli-Arab local leaders situated in disadvantaged 
places who, nonetheless, succeeded in promoting their original socio-political views and 
achieving practical, beneficial reforms. Though context does matter, the fact remains that 
the under similar conditions, distinct types of leaders came to power (even in same town): 
hierarchical versus egalitarian; pragmatic-reformers versus radicals, questioning the ‘context 
thesis’.
Leadership76
Leadership also matters. A most significant finding is that the same bad conditions may either 
be considered as insurmountable challenges or as windows of opportunity, depending on 
those leaders’ prior orientations, presumptions, and strength of character. The empirical sec-
tion pointed to several strategies by which these local leaders were able to fight against the 
negative circumstances and find the fortitude to proactively improve their environments by 
identifying competitive advantages for making their places more attractive and worthy of 
local pride. Projects to bring more affluent residents as a means of potentially raising the over-
all socioeconomic status; reforms improving the local school system; construction and repairs 
of physical infrastructures, and other projects to improve wellbeing in the peripheries of Israel 
and to reform the quality of local government—all these outcomes fundamentally contradict 
the negative mechanism known in Marxist thought, that leaders of lower-class populations 
are forced to take an integral part in producing the problem. The Marxist notion of “produc-
tion is at same time reproduction” limits to theoretical sphere.
The ultimate questions are: What enabled these particular local leaders to deal so well with 
their bad situations and to successfully transform negative social dynamics into positive out-
comes? How are certain local leaders in disadvantaged areas able to overcome all the negative 
predispositions and preconceptions in order to forge new, positive, viable notions and meth-
ods of action in order to gain public cooperation and make real progress?
The analysis pointed to a set of abstract resources and abilities that drew from leader’s per-
sonality. This set operate as independent variable, i.e., one that is not fully synchronized (and 
cannot be synchronized) with objective conditions. This include: values, perceptions, motiva-
tion, determination, creativity, charisma, family affection, formal education, memories, nar-
rative and biographical resources.
The present findings reveal some answers in regard to practical policy and methods. Two sub-
systems must first be differentiated: the leader’s value system and leader’s resources. The first 
refers to the question: What are the basic values, perceptions or the cultural coordinates that 
guide a leader’s path and policy? Is that leader hierarchical, meritocratic or egalitarian? Does 
he/she follow a competitive logic (win-lose) or a ‘win-win’ strategy? The second subsystem 
refers to the question: What are the personal abilities that this leader may utilize to implement 
his/her values and policies? Is this leader a conventional-rational thinker (following prevailing 
norms) or does he/she utilize (unique) personal biographical resources? Does he/she have an 
‘expert mind’ or an ‘open mind’? Does this leader interact with his/her constituents like a trans-
actional leader or a transformational leader (i.e., utilizing intrinsic versus extrinsic resources)?
By getting answers to all these questions, policy makers, as well as researchers, can better 
analyze and evaluate both the direction and the depth of changes being made by local leaders 
regarding various issues.
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